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Recent Equal Protection
Decisions-Fundamental Right to
Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect

Class?
Thomas R. McCoy*
In the spring of 1974, in the case of MemorialHospital v. Maricopa County,' the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Arizona statute requiring a year's residence in a county as
a condition to an indigent's receiving nonemergency medical care at
the county's expense. In reaching this result the Court relied upon
the line of reasoning evolved in Shapiro v. Thompson 2 and reaffirmed in Dunn v. Blumstein3 that such durational residence requirements create a classification that penalizes the fundamental
right to travel and that must, therefore, be justified by a "compelling state interest" or be found to violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.4
The thesis of this article is two-fold. First, the Court's acceptance and application of the Shapiro-Dunnreasoning in Maricopa
unintentionally demonstrated the intellectual inadequacy of that
much-discussed line of reasoning. Read together, the Court's opinions in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa establish a set of theoretical
principles whose derivation is logically defective, whose consistent
application would require unacceptable results in many other cases,
and whose existence now forces the Court to distinguish arbitrarily
other cases that, in terms of those theoretical principles, simply are
not distinguishable from Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa.5 Secondly,
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.S., Xavier University, 1964; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1967; LL.M., Harvard University, 1968.
1. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
2. 394'U.S. 618 (1969).
3. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
4. 415 U.S. at 254.
5. This type of practice by the Court has long been attacked by one body of commentators who, in the words of Professor Wechsler, view the role of the Court as follows:
The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them to review
the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions, even though
the action involves value choices, as invariably action does. In doing so, however, they
are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power organ. . . . This calls for facing
how determinations of this kind can be asserted to have any legal quality. The answer,
I suggest, inheres primarily in that they are-or are obliged to be-entirely principled.
A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with
respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved . . ..
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despite the logical inadequacy and practical disutility of the theoretical reasoning of Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa,the actual result
in each of those cases is defensible on the basis of classic fourteenth
amendment principles that lead to neither the undesirable results
nor the arbitrary distinctions required by application of the
Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopareasoning to other cases. To develop this
thesis, the doctrines underlying substantive due process and equal
protection will be examined, and the "right to travel" cases will be
analyzed in light of applicable fourteenth amendment principles.
I.

THE DOCTRINES OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION

All state action directed at individuals, whether in the form of
a restraint on individual interests or a distribution of some benefit
to individuals, must satisfy both the substantive due process requirements and the equal protection requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. Generally, substantive due process and equal protection impose on state action distinct and separate constitutional requirements. The doctrine of substantive due process is concerned
with whether a particular state interference with some individual
interest is adequately justified.' Whether the interference is imposed equally upon all persons is irrelevant to the requirements of
substantive due process.7 This conceptually secondary question of
the state's equal treatment of individuals is the focus of the equal
protection doctrine. Even if the state action has met the requirements of substantive due process, the doctrine of equal protection
prohibits the unequal treatment of different classes of persons by
state action without adequate justification for that inequality.'
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAav. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959).
A more tolerant attitude toward unprincipled decisions by the Court is evidenced by
Professor Black in a reply to Professor Wechsler. Speaking of the line of segregation decisions
following Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Black asserted that "[o]pinions
composed under painful stresses may leave much to be desired . . .[b]ut the judgments,
in law and in fact, are as right and true as any that ever was uttered." Black, The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421, 430 (1959).
6. "Life, liberty, or property," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. With respect to federal action, the Court has held that the due process language of
the fifth amendment incorporates the prohibitions of both the due process and the equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). "Thus, if a classification would be invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with
the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,
364-65 n.4 (1974).
8. "'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing
with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated.
'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between
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In dealing with cases based on the requirements of substantive
due process, the Court has distinguished two categories of state
actions: (1) state actions that interfere with some individual interest
that can be broadly categorized as "life, liberty, or property" and
(2) state actions that interfere with an individual interest appropriately described as a "fundamental right." According to the Court's
analysis, an action of the former type is adequately justified for
purposes of due process if the action bears "a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose."' This "rational basis" test for state
actions that are challenged on substantive due process grounds first
appeared in its present form in the mid-1930's in cases upholding
the constitutionality of state statutory schemes that regulated retail
prices'" and minimum wages." The development of this relatively
tolerant standard was a rejection of the severe standard previously
used by the Court to invalidate similar social welfare statutes."
Thus, state laws regulating economic affairs are classic examples of
state actions that interfere with individual liberty and property and
are subjected to this "rational basis test" by the requirements of
substantive due process.' 3
On the other hand, when a state action interferes with an
individual interest that the Court characterizes as a "fundamental right," substantive due process requires that the action
be justified by a finding that it is the least restrictive method
available" to the state to effectuate a "compelling state interest."' 5 This stricter substantive due process test originally was
applied by the Court in cases in which the individual interest infringed upon by the state was a liberty specifically protected from
federal infringement by the first amendment.'" Thus, freedom of
classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable." Ross v. Moffit, 417
U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
9. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
10. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
11. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
12. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. It has been suggested that in the area of economic regulation the rational basis
standard applied by the Court is so tolerant that it constitutes no standard at all. McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT.
REV. 34, 39; see North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S.
156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see generally Note, The Less Restrictive
Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Analysis, A Justification,and Some Criteria,
27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974).
15. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
16. "The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can
justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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association,17 freedom of speech,"S and free exercise of religion'9 have
routinely enjoyed the more stringent protection of this second substantive due process test. Recently, however, the Court has interpreted those earlier cases as resting, not directly on the specific
enumeration of the protected rights in the first amendment, but on
the characterization of those rights as "fundamental.""0 Under this
view, while the rights enumerated in the first amendment may be
fundamental, certain unenumerated rights also may be fundamental and therefore equally deserving of protection under the stricter
substantive due process test. Following this line of reasoning, the
Court in Roe v. Wade 21 specifically added the unenumerated right
of personal privacy to the list of "fundamental 22rights" entitled to
the protection of the "compelling interest" test.
In developing the doctrine of equal protection, the Court has
evolved a parallel pair of standards for the justification required for
any unequal treatment of individuals by the state. Whenever the
state distributes unequally the burdens of a regulatory scheme or
dispenses benefits unequally, the equal protection clause traditionally has required that the inequality of treatment be justified by a
showing that it is rationally related to the effectuation of a legitimate state goal. For example, a state statute setting a minimum age
for driver's licenses creates two classes of individuals- those above
the age and those below the age- and regulates those classes unequally. Similarly, a state welfare scheme whose benefits are available only to families with incomes below a certain level creates two
classes of persons-those above and those below the specified
level-and distributes the benefits of welfare unequally between the
two classes. The inequality of treatment inherent in the driver's
license law or the welfare scheme will be found to violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment only if the state
cannot show that it is rationally related to the effectuation of a
legitimate state goal.2
17. E.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
18. E.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936).
19. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 152-55.
23. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Fisher v. Secretary of HEW, No. 74-1740 (7th Cir., Sept. 3, 1975) (upholding
the constitutionality of eligibility requirements of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
423(c)(1)(b)(i) (1970) by applying a rational basis test under an equal protection attack).
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In two types of situations the Court has held that an inequality
must be justified by a showing that it is necessary to effectuate a
"compelling interest" of the state, a much stricter justification for
unequal treatment. First, a showing of a compelling state interest
will be required whenever the class of persons disadvantaged by the
unequal treatment is a "suspect" class, the traditional example of
which is a class defined in terms of race. On the basis of the Court's
reasoning in Korematsu v. United States,2 4 unequal treatment of
one race with respect to another has been held to violate the equal
protection clause unless the state is able to demonstrate that the
inequality of treatment promotes a compelling state interest.2 More
recently, the Court has held that "alienage" 2 and "lineage, ' 27 like
race, are suspect classifications and must be justified by a compelling state interest.2 On occasion the Court has appeared to add
further classes such as wealth2 or political affiliation" to the list of
suspect classifications, but in subsequent cases it has failed to implement these suggestions.3 1 The result is that only race, alienage,
and lineage have been clearly established as "suspect" classifications for equal protection purposes. Most recently, in the case of
2
Frontiero v. Richardson,1
four Justices specifically stated that sex
should be held to be a suspect classification requiring the "stricter
standard" of equal protection review. Three other Justices, purporting to apply only the weaker "reasonable basis" standard, concurred
in finding that particular sex classification violative of equal protection. In spite of the protestations of the concurring three Justices,
Frontiero ultimately may come to stand for the addition of sex to
the list of "suspect categories" requiring stricter review under the
3
equal protection clause.
24. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964).
26. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
27. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (classification based on minor
citizen's ancestry violates equal protection).
28. It has been suggested that the relationship of lineage and alienage to race led to
this development. Note, Developments in the Law, Equal Protection,82 HARv. L. REV. 1065,
1124 n.266 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. This, however, is an expansion of the
doctrine beyond the original purpose of the equal protection clause.
29. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
30. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
31. For a conspicuous failure to implement the suggestion that wealth is a suspect
classification see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See also San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973). With respect to political affiliation see American
Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
32. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
33. Although the three concurring Justices specifically declined to adopt the stricter
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The second type of situation in which the Court will require a
showing of a compelling reason for unequal treatment arises when
the individual interest concerned is a "fundamental right." The
Court laid the foundation for this second branch of the more rigorous equal protection standard in the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma."
In Skinner the Court held that sterilizing one class of habitual criminals while exempting another class of habitual criminals was unequal treatment that must be supported by a justification beyond a
mere showing of some rational basis for the distinction. The Court
subjected this inequality of treatment to strict scrutiny because the
individual interest concerned was "one of the basic civil rights.""3
The Skinner reasoning has been used by the Court to apply the
stricter equal protection standard to state laws that unequally regulate access to the ballot36 and weight the votes of one district une37
qually with respect to those of another district.
Because a fundamental right is being regulated unequally, the
potential exists for confusing this equal protection doctrine with the
strict substantive due process doctrine discussed above. While this
second branch of strict equal protection requires a showing of compelling interest to justify any inequality in the regulation of such a
fundamental right, the strict due process doctrine discussed above
requires a showing of a compelling interest to justify any regulation
of such a right (even though the regulation may be equal in its
impact). Theoretically, state regulation of a fundamental right like
the right to vote raises separate due process and equal protection
questions. First, is the interference with the fundamental right justified by a compelling state interest? Secondly, if the interference is
imposed on individuals unequally, is the inequality justified by a
compelling state interest? Thus, the doctrines of due process and
equal protection that the Court has evolved to date can be outlined
in "hornbook" fashion as follows:
standard of review advanced by the plurality, the classification that they held devoid of a
rational basis seemed in fact to be related quite reasonably to the legislative purpose. Thus,
the conclusion may be inescapable that while they spoke in terms of the traditional standard,
they actually subjected the classification to a standard closer to the strict standard of the
plurality. See id. at 691-92. One other Justice concurred in the result without articulating
the standard with which he judged the classification. Id. at 691. But see Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
34. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
35. Id. at 541.
36. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
37. E.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 52-53 (1970); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
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I.

Substantive Due Process Requirements:
1. Rational Basis Test-Any state regulation of individual
life, liberty, or property must be rationally related to the
effectuation of a legitimate state interest.
2. Compelling Interest Test-When the individual interest regulated is a fundamental right, the regulation must be
the least restrictive method available for the effectuation of
a compelling state interest.

II.

Equal Protection Requirements:
1. Rational Basis Test-Any inequality in the treatment
accorded two separate classes of persons by the state must
be rationally related to the effectuation of a legitimate state
interest.
2. Compelling Interest Testa. Suspect Class-When the class of persons disadvantaged by the unequal treatment is a suspect class, the
inequality of treatment must be necessary to effectuate a
compelling state interest.
b. Fundamental Right-When the unequal treatment is the unequal regulation of a fundamental right, the
inequality of treatment must be necessary to effectuate a
compelling state interest.

The Burger Court has begun to face increasing numbers of
equal protection cases in which the alleged discrimination defies
easy assignment to one of the three categories defined in the fashion
of the Warren Court above. Some of these cases have concerned
attacks on classifications that seem to raise many, but not all, of the
same considerations that resulted in the establishment of race and
alienage as suspect classifications subject to the compelling interest
test. 8 Others have dealt with discriminatory regulation of individual interests that are clearly more important to the Court than
individual economic arrangements, but do not seem to be as basic
as access to the ballot or other "fundamental rights," whose unequal
regulation must be justified by a compelling state interest. 9 Not
surprisingly, several members of the Court have reacted to these
cases by consciously or unconsciously moving away from the strict,
two-tiered equal protection analysis in favor of an ad hoc weighing
38. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (unequal treatment of conscientious
objectors); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex-based classification); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth classification); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex-based classification).
39. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right to
education); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (right to welfare).
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of the state interest offered in justification of the discrimination
against the invidiousness of the classification or the importance of
the individual interest and the seriousness of the state's interference. In some instances, the Justices have engaged in this case-bycase weighing by conspicuously failing to state the standard against
which the state interest is being measured. 0 In other instances,
certain Justices have purported to measure the state interest
against the traditional rational basis standard while holding the
state to a standard of justification that obviously is much stricter
than the "hands off" rational basis standard usually applied in
economic regulation cases.41
Among the Justices who have used on occasion some standard
in between hands-off rational basis and strict compelling interest,
Justice Marshall has been the most forthright and consistent advocate of the substitution of a "sliding scale" of strictness for the rigid
two-tiered approach usually imposed in equal protection cases.4 2 To
date, it appears that only one other member of the Court has been
willing to embrace openly Justice Marshall's articulation of what
the Court in fact has been doing. 3
The Marshall analysis casts considerable doubt on the practical
utility of forcing the nearly infinite variety of individual interests
into the fundamental-nonfundamental conceptual dichotomy or of
forcing the variety of potential classifications into the suspectnonsuspect conceptual dichotomy. The seriousness of the defect in
the classification and the importance of the right unequally regu40. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 270 (1974) (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., concurring in the result); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
41. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Burger, C.J., Powell &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (no rational basis for
Kansas recoupment statute denying to indigent defendants the statutory rights of other
debtors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (plurality opinion) (a ban on the use of
contraceptives by single persons invalidated, citing traditional equal protection principles).
See Gunther, Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
New Equal Protection, 86 HAav. L. REv. 1 (1972).
42. The Court apparently seeks to establish . . . that equal protection cases fall
into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection
defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals
that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in
the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
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lated, however, are separate and distinct reasons for requiring a
certain level of justification by the state-whether an infinite number of levels of justification are possible, as Marshall suggests, or
only two, as the "hornbook" outline above suggests. In other words,
while the dichotomy between fundamental and nonfundamental
interests in fact may represent a "sliding scale" or continuum of
levels of importance, it is a qualitatively different "sliding scale"
from the one represented by the dichotomy between suspect and
nonsuspect classifications. Thus, the conceptual distinction between a defect in the class drawn by the state and the importance
of the individual interest unequally regulated by the state would
seem to retain analytic validity and utility even under the Marshall
"sliding scale" analysis. Unfortunately, it is precisely this conceptual distinction that the Court has blurred badly in the process of
deciding the Shapiro line of cases.
II.

Shapiro v. Thompson"

Shapiro involved the constitutionality of residence requirements in the welfare statutes of two states and the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs attacked as violative of due process and equal
protection the requirement that an applicant reside in the state or
in the District for one year before becoming eligible for welfare
payments. Invoking the second branch of the strict equal protection
doctrine, the Court held that discrimination between applicants
who had resided in the state for more than one year and those who
had resided there for less than one year was unequal treatment that
"penalized" the exercise of the fundamental right to travel and that
therefore must be justified by a compelling state interest." Concluding that none of the interests proffered to justify the inequality of
treatment were "compelling," the Court held that the residence
requirements violated the equal protection clauses of the fifth and
fourteen amendments.
In view of the theoretical relationship between the due process
and equal protection doctrines outlined in the discussion above, the
Court normally should have addressed the due process questions
first." This would have involved three inquiries: whether the state
44. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
45. Id. at 634.
46. [W]hen . . . a classification is based upon the exercise of rights guaranteed
against state infringement by the Federal Constitution, . . . there is no need for any
resort to the Equal Protection Clause; in such instances, this Court may properly and
straightforwardly invalidate any undue burden upon those rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Id. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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infringed upon some individual liberty; if so, whether the liberty
interfered with was a fundamental right; and if so, whether a compelling state interest justified the regulation. In fact, the Court
never addressed this initial substantive due process question. It
appears that the Court was at least intuitively aware that the case
did not involve the infringement of any fundamental
right-specifically, the right to travel. Notwithstanding the Court's
use of emotionally charged language implying the contrary,47 no one
had been "fenced out" of the state in the normal sense of that term.
Since the defendant states neither directly nor indirectly had interfered with travel by the plaintiffs, the Court's intuition correctly led
it to by-pass without discussion the contention that the questioned
residence requirements violated substantive due process by infringing on the fundamental right to travel. Nor did the residence requirements raise substantive due process problems when viewed
simply as a direct regulation of availability of welfare benefits. A
state may choose to establish no welfare system at all and not
thereby run afoul of the requirements of substantive due process. In
other words, a right to welfare is not among the rights of "life,
liberty, or property" protected by the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.4" Since there is no constitutional
right to welfare, a state regulation of the availability of welfare
benefits cannot alone violate the requirements of substantive due
process.
On the other hand, when a state chooses to dispense benefits
such as welfare payments, the constitutional doctrine of equal protection requires that it do so equally or be able to adequately justify
any inequality. While the defendant states in Shapiro did not "fence
out" anyone from the state by the welfare residence requirements,
they did deprive a class of persons (residents for less than one year)
of welfare benefits. This led the Court to conclude correctly that the
constitutional problem created by the residence requirements was
essentially a problem of equal protection. The critical theoretical
error in Shapiro occurred when the Court invoked the second or
"fundamental rights" branch of the strict equal protection doctrine
and subjected the inequality of treatment to the compelling state
interest test on the ground that the questioned classification served
to "penalize" the fundamental right to travel. In support of this
assertion, the Court cited without further explanation the substantive due process case of Sherbert v. Verner.49
47. Id. at 631.
48. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Gunther, supra note 41, at 13.
49. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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Certainly no regulation or restriction of the right to travel in the
ordinary sense was present. 0 No criminal prohibition against travelling into the state or against assisting travel into the state was
enforced," nor was even the minimal restriction of a small tax on
entry into or departure from the state. 52 Of course, the state may
infringe upon an individual right through means other than direct
regulation. The Court made clear in Sherbert that a state unemployment compensation law that conditioned availability of benefits upon willingness to work on Saturday infringed upon plaintiff
sabbatarian's first amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
Although no general constitutional right to unemployment compensation and no evidence of intent by the legislature to deter religious
practices by sabbatarians were found, the Court stated that "conditions on public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate,
whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms."5 3 According to the Court in Sherbert, governmental imposition of a choice between unemployment compensation and adherence to the appellant's religious observances deterred or inhibited appellant's exercise of freedom of religion by
rewarding the nonexercise of that right. Such a state-created reward
for nonexercise of appellant's religious freedom put "the same kind
of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship. 51 4 Since the Court was
unable to identify a compelling state interest to justify this infringement of appellant's fundamental right, the state unemployment
compensation statute was found to violate the requirements of substantive due process.
The welfare residence requirements attacked in Shapiro, however, did not present even an indirect burden or penalty of the type
identified in Sherbert. Prior to their moves to the defendant states,
the plaintiffs had absolutely no claim in those states for welfare
benefits. Immediately after moving to the defendant states their
situation with respect to those states was unchanged-that is, they
still had no eligibility for welfare benefits. With respect to the defendant states the plaintiffs simply were no worse off than before their
moves. To be sure, the defendant states were not as attractive a
destination as they would have been had welfare benefits been made
50. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 650 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); accord,
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 285-86 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
52. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
53. 374 U.S. at 405.
54. Id. at 404.
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available to new residents immediately upon arrival, especially if
their welfare benefits were unusually generous. But failing to offer
benefits that would make the state a more attractive place does not
in any ordinary sense constitute penalizing those who travel to the
state or inhibiting travel to the state by rewarding nonexercise of a
right as in Sherbert."
Furthermore, it is not at all clear from the facts stated by the
Court that the plaintiffs were actually disadvantaged in even the
slightest degree by the unavailability of welfare payments in their
new states of residence. Since the Court apparently did not consider
the fact important enough to mention, it could be assumed that the
states from which the plaintiffs came had no welfare scheme at all
or that the plaintiffs were ineligible for welfare under the eligibility
standards of those states. Under that assumption, the plaintiffs' net
position after moving would be at least as good as their position
before moving. In fact, their position might have improved slightly
since they would now be eligible for benefits in the new state once
a year of residence had passed. It would seem nonsensical to assert
that plaintiffs were somehow disadvantaged or penalized in their
interstate movement by the absence of welfare benefits in the new
states. Since the Court did not indicate whether the plaintiffs relinquished welfare benefits in the states from which they moved, it
surely did not rely on that fact in reaching its conclusion. In effect,
the Court seems to have held that the plaintiffs were penalized in
their interstate movement by the absence of welfare payments in
their new states even though they did not forego any welfare payments by leaving the states of their former residence.
If, on the other hand, we assume that the plaintiffs by moving
to the defendant states were forced to relinquish an established right
to welfare in the states from which they came, the closest analogy
to the Sherbert problem is the withdrawal of welfare benefits by the
plaintiffs' old states of residence. The old states of residence presumably conditioned their welfare benefits upon plaintiffs' remaining in those states, thus putting the plaintiffs to the choice between
continued receipt of welfare benefits and exercise of their fundamental right to travel out of the state. Thus, the old states of residence penalized the plaintiffs' exercise of their right to travel in the
Sherbert sense by rewarding nonexercise of the right with continued
payment of welfare benefits.
Even if we accept at face value the Court's assertion in Shapiro
that ineligibility for welfare in the new states of residence penalized
the plaintiffs' fundamental right to travel in the Sherbert sense, the
55.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 649-50 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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analytical consequences of the Shapiro holding are unacceptably
broad. If the unavailability of welfare payments in the new states
burdened the plaintiffs' right to travel to those states, the fact that
those states chose to pay welfare to other residents in no way increased the burden on the plaintiffs' right to travel. In other words,
if the defendant states had provided no welfare system at all, the
unavailability of welfare benefits to the plaintiffs would have constituted exactly the same burden on plaintiffs' right to travel to those
states. Thus, the Court's holding in Shapiro leads inescapably to the
conclusion that any state that does not have a system of welfare has
burdened the fundamental right of all indigents to travel into that
state and must under the requirements of substantive due process
demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify its refusal to enact
a welfare statute . 5 The same problem would be encountered by any
state whose existing welfare scheme provides lower benefits than
those available in other states or whose eligibility standards exclude
persons or families who would be eligible for welfare under the
standards of other states. Because of differences in the size of benefits or the scope of eligibility provisions, some persons travelling
from a state with more generous provisions to a state with less
generous provisions would suffer a net reduction in welfare benefits.
This net disadvantage or loss resulting from such a move would
constitute precisely the same sort of burden on the right of those
persons to travel as did the net loss of welfare benefits suffered by
plaintiffs in Shapiro. Thus, all states would be required under substantive due process to demonstrate a compelling state interest for
their refusal to offer welfare benefits at least as high as the most
generous available anywhere in the United States or to have eligibility provisions at least as liberal as the most liberal in force in any
of the other forty-nine states.
Once established (as it seems to be in Shapiro), such a principle
would be virtually unlimited in its applicability. It would seem to
apply any time a state or political subdivision of a state offers lower
quality schools than those available in some other state, has less
regular garbage collection than that available in some other state,
provides more limited water and sewer service than that available
in some other state, contains lower quality roads than those provided in some other state, or charges higher state university tuition
than that charged for a comparable education in some other state.
Travellers from those other states will suffer a loss in benefits of
residence in the new state as compared with those available in the
old and thus experience precisely the same sort of disincentive to
56.

Contra, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n.12 (1972).
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travel as that experienced by the plaintiffs in Shapiro. Under
Shapiro the new state in each of these situations has burdened or
penalized the fundamental right of those who would travel to the
state from some state with greater benefits for residents, and it
would be forced by the requirements of substantive due process to
demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify its failure to provide the particular benefits at the level existing in the state from
which the traveller came.
It is interesting to note in this connection that the Court in
Shapiro focused only on the disadvantage of loss of welfare payments suffered by plaintiffs as a result of their move without considering the possibility that other benefits of residence in the defendant
states, such as more readily available public housing or higher quality public schools, offset the loss of welfare and resulted in a net gain
in total benefits provided to the plaintiffs. Thus it would seem that
a state could not avoid constitutional attack on its comparatively
inferior garbage collection or water and sewer service by a demonstration of a net gain in total state benefits by any move into the
state by virtue of the superior quality of its schools, highways, housing, health care facilities, and other services.
Obviously it was not the intent of the Court in Shapiro to create
such a massive constitutional quagmire. In the face of these obviously unacceptable, yet analytically unavoidable applications of
the Shapiro rationale, it could be argued that the burden on the
fundamental right to travel identified in Shapiro should be considered a burden only for purposes of the equal protection clause. The
first problem with such an attempt to confine the Shapiro rationale
is that the burden on the right to travel posed by the absence of
welfare in the new state is a simple fact that remains unchanged
whether one measures the burden against the requirements of due
process or equal protection. 57 In fact, the Sherbert case from which
the Court purports to draw its peculiar notion of penalty was a
substantive due process decision: the state statute must be justified
by a compelling state interest because it exacted a price for the
exercise of a fundamental right. But even if this logical defect is
overlooked, the suggested limitation does not eliminate the undesirable overbreadth of the Shapiro reasoning. For instance, assume
57. [A] law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional right of interstate
travel must be shown to reflect a compelling governmental interest. This is necessarily
true whether the impinging law be a classification statute to be tested against the Equal
Protection Clause, or a state or federal regulatory law, to be tested against the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment. (Emphasis supplied by Court).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643-44 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring); accord, id. at
659 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoted at note 46 supra).
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that the welfare statute in State X makes benefits available only to
those with a net yearly income of less than $1,500, while the statute
in State Y makes similar benefits available to individuals with net
incomes of less than $2,500. An individual in State Y with a net
annual income of $2,000 who was receiving welfare benefits from
State Y would, if he moved to State X, be completely ineligible for
welfare benefits. This loss of benefits would burden his fundamental
right to travel to State X from State Y, thus subjecting State X to
the substantive due process requirement that it show a compelling
state interest for its more restrictive eligibility standards. If this due
process argument is met with the suggested objection that Shapiro
establishes such a burden only for purposes of equal protection, the
traveller simply could recast his objection in terms of equal protection. He would point out that State X in its eligibility requirements
discriminates between two classes of persons in State X: those with
net incomes over $1,500, and those with net incomes below $1,500.
In the case of our hypothetical traveller this discrimination between
these two classes in State X results in his loss of welfare benefits
when he moves to State X from State Y. Thus, the classification
chosen by State X has served to penalize or disadvantage our traveller in his move from State Y. It seems obvious that such a result
would not have been intended by the Court in Shapiro, yet State X
is not protected from that result by the suggestion that the Shapiro
rationale is limited to equal protection cases.
Another attempt to limit the applicability of the Shapiro rationale has emerged in the opinions of Justice Marshall subsequent
to Shapiro. The cornerstone of Marshall's position is a cryptic footnote in the Shapiro opinion disclaiming any view of the validity of
residence requirements for tuition-free education or licenses to practice a profession or for hunting and fishing. According to the footnote, "[s]uch requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon
the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel."58 From
this disclaimer, Marshall has concluded that only sufficiently important59 disabilities resulting from interstate travel are "penalties"
triggering strict equal protection review and that other less important disabilities do not trigger strict review.A0 On this basis, he apparently has conceded that the Shapiro rationale may not require
the subjecting of residence requirements for instate tuition eligibil58.
59.
60.

394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418-20 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974).
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ity to the compelling interest test." Somehow, Justice Marshall
seems to feel that he has resolved the analytical problems created
by Shapiro with the simple device of italicizing the word "penalty"
when discussing certain disadvantages incurred as a result of interstate travel."
In fact, as Justice Rehnquist has pointed out, it is very difficult
to perceive any doctrinal basis for Justice Marshall's assertion that
some penalties on the right to travel are "penalties" while others are
merely "penalties."6 3 Any disability imposed by the state as a result
of travel, however unimportant, would seem to be a penalty on the
exercise of the right to travel. Of course, if Marshall were simply
contending that only the unequal regulation of a fundamental constitutional right, such as the right to vote, constitutes a penalty, the
fundamental rights branch of equal protection would require the
application of the compelling interest test without any reference to
the right to travel." But the list of Marshall's established
"penalties" includes interference with the individual's interest in
welfare,65 free medical care,66 and the availability of a divorce. 7
None of these interests qualify as fundamental constitutional rights
whose unequal regulation must be subjected to the compelling interest test under the "fundamental rights" branch of strict equal protection. Nor is the list of "penalties" restricted by Justice Marshall
to those disabilities that may have the effect of actually deterring
interstate travel. 8 Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that inclusion in or exclusion from Marshall's list of disabilities that qualify as "penalties" is, as Justice Rehnquist observed, simply a matter
' '69
of "ipse dixit.
In Dandridgev. Williams," Justice Marshall failed to persuade
the majority that Shapiro should be read as declaring the right to
welfare to be a fundamental right for purposes of strict equal protection since in Shapiro it was the right to welfare that actually was
regulated unequally and it was the unequal treatment that was
subjected to the compelling interest test. In his dissent in
61. See id. at 258-59. But see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 455 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
62. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257 (1974); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972).
63. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 284 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
64. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
66. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
67. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974).
69. Id. at 285 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Dandridge, Marshall argued that "when a benefit, even a 'gratuitious' benefit, is necessary to sustain life, stricter constitutional
standards . . . are applied to the deprivation of that benefit.""2
When Marshall later finds that denials of such "necessities of life"
as welfare benefits and free medical care constitute "penalties" on
the right to travel while other disabilities are not "penalties," one
is left with the suspicion that Marshall's italicized "penalty" is
simply a reincarnation of his Dandridge dissent.
Since the defendant states did not penalize or burden the right
to travel in any ordinary sense, since it seems the Court was not even
concerned with whether the plaintiffs suffered an actual disadvantage because of their move (as a result of loss of payments by the
old state of residence), and since it seems clear that the Court would
find unacceptable the breadth of the principles that are the logically
unavoidable result of the Shapiro reasoning, 3 the Court must actually have been concerned with some aspect of the residence requirements other than the fact that unavailability of welfare in the
defendant states burdened the fundamental right of the plaintiffs
to travel to those states. This gap between the intuitive policy concerns of the Court and its articulated reasoning emerges with greater
clarity in the Court's application of the Shapiro reasoning in Dunn
v. Blumstein.4
III.

Dunn v. Blumstein

In Dunn, Tennessee's residence requirements for voting in
county and state elections were challenged as violations of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Tennessee required residence in the state for one year and in the
county for three months as prerequisites to voting. Noting that the
one-year durational residence requirements discriminated between
recently arrived citizens and long-term citizens in regulating exercise of the fundamental right to vote, the Court subjected the requirement to the second or "fundamental rights" branch of the
strict equal protection doctrine and demanded that the discrimination be justified by a compelling state interest. Since none of the
reasons advanced by the state in support of the unequal regulation
of the fundamental right to vote were found by the Court to be
compelling, that residence requirement was held to violate the equal
protection clause.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 522.
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259-60, 260 n.15 (1974).
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n.12 (1972).
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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Had the Court approached the plaintiffs claims in the order
consistently suggested by Justice Harlan in cases such as this,"5 it
would have determined first whether this regulation of the fundamental right to vote violated the requirements of substantive due
process. Since the restricted right in this case was a fundamental
right, the strict due process doctrine would require that the restriction be justified by a compelling state interest, whether or not the
restriction was equally imposed. In light of its discussion of the
equal protection issue,"6 it is clear that the Court felt that the restriction was not supported by any compelling state interest." Thus,
had Justice Harlan's advice been followed, the residence requirement would have been found unconstitutional on the basis of plaintiff's claim that it violated substantive due process. Instead, however, following an emerging pattern in right-to-vote cases, 8 the
Court overlooked the invalidity of the unjustified restriction on a
right in order to address the inequality issue.
Nor did the Court address plaintiff's contention that the residence requirement restricted his fundamental right to travel in violation of the strict substantive due process doctrine. As was suggested in the discussion of Shapiro above, 9 such a rationale would
seem to be the logically inevitable result of the Shapiro finding that
such residence requirements "penalized" the fundamental right to
travel in the Sherbert sense of making the exercise of the right
costly. Instead of applying either suggested strict substantive due
process ground, the Court offered the Shapiro equal protection reasoning as an alternative rationale for its finding that the residence
requirement must be justified by a compelling state interest." According to Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, the Shapiro
reasoning was directly applicable and required the conclusion that
the durational residence requirement discriminated between two
classes of residents in such a way that it penalized the fundamental
right to travel." Thus, the second or "fundamental rights" branch
75. See note 46 supra.
76. 405 U.S. at 345-60.
77. Since the issue was couched in terms of equal protection, the state was required to
justify restricting the right to vote of one class of residents while allowing other residents to
exercise that right unrestricted. Thus, the grounds offered by the state to justify the disadvantageous treatment of the one class of residents are the same as the grounds that would be
offered to justify restricting the right to vote of that class.
78. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
79. See text accompanying notes 44-74 supra.
80. 405 U.S. at 338-42.
81. Unlike Shapiro, in which one could assume arguendo that plaintiffs did not give up
similar welfare benefits when they left their old state, it is clear in Dunn that plaintiff, by
moving, did suffer the loss of the ability to vote in elections in his old state. As in Shapiro,

1975]

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL

1005

of the strict equal protection doctrine required that the discrimination be found to violate the equal protection clause unless a compelling interest could be shown by the state to justify the discrimination.
In an attempt to avoid this application of Shapiro to the residence requirement in Dunn, the state had argued that the material
facts of Shapiro were distinguishable from those in Dunn. The state
argued in Dunn that the residence requirements in Shapiro penalized the right to travel because they were intentionally designed to
deter persons from moving into the state, but that no similar design
2 It can be ascould be inferred from the requirements in Dunn."
sumed that the unavailability of welfare would be considered by low
income persons deciding whether to move to the state and might
deter them from making the move. In fact, the Court in Shapiro
pointed out that the District of Columbia had admitted in pleading
and argument an awareness of this possible effect and an intention
to deter movement of low income persons to the state. On the other
hand, the state argued, no such deterrent effect on interstate relocation would result from the residence requirements questioned in
Dunn. The inability to vote in state elections for one year after
moving to the state simply would not be considered by a person in
deciding to move. Since no such deterrent effect is even remotely
likely, it would be difficult to infer any intention by the State of
Tennessee to deter movement to the state through the use of the
questioned residence requirement.
Although the illogic of the Shapiro characterization of the residence requirements as a "penalty" on the right to travel could have
been eliminated by accepting this distinction proferred by Tennessee, the Court in Dunn specifically rejected that reading of
Shapiro.4 The Court effectively conceded that not the slightest intentional or incidental interference with anyone's interstate travel
resulted from the questioned residence requirements;5 yet it concluded that the residence requirements "penalized" the fundamental right'to travel in some uncommon sense of that word. Since there
was in fact no regulation of or effect on travel, the "penalty" rationhowever, that Sherbert-style "penalty" on the right to travel or reward for nonexercise of the
right was imposed by the old state of residence. Because of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
plaintiff's move in Dunn did not result in any net loss in his ability to vote in federal elections.
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a)(2) (1970).
82. Brief for Appellants at 13, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (quoted in 405
U.S. at 339).
83. 394 U.S. at 629.
84. "This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law." 405 U.S. at 339.
85. Id. at 340-41.
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ale can hardly be accepted as an adequate description of the underlying concern that caused the Court to subject the Tennessee residence requirements to the compelling state interest test.
The Court could have rested its requirement of a compelling
state interest solely on a finding that the residence requirements
unequally regulated the fundamental right to vote. If it wished an
alternative rationale for requiring a compelling state interest, the
Court could have employed strict substantive due piocess on the
ground that the residence requirements restricted the fundamental
right to vote. With such strong bases for its holding in well-established doctrine, why did the Court reject Tennessee's explanation
of Shapiro and adopt the least persuasive version of the Shapiro
rationale as an alternative grounds for its holding in Dunn? In view
of the logical defects in Shapiro, it hardly seems likely that the
Court found the articulated reasoning in that decision compelling.
The explanation for the appeal of the Shapiro rationale must lie in
intuitive policy concerns that are only imprecisely articulated in the
Shapiro and Dunn opinions. The clearest insight into the underlying
policy concern of the Court in Shapiro and Dunn is contained in a
pregnant footnote to Marshall's majority opinion in Dunn:
Where, for example, an interstate migrant loses his driver's license because the new State has a higher age requirement, a different constitutional
question is presented. For in such a case, the new State's age requirement is
not a penalty imposed solely because the newcomer is a new resident; instead,
all residents, old and new, must be of a prescribed age to drive."

Marshall appears to distinguish between Shapiro-Dunn and his
hypothetical case on the ground that the hypothetical loss of a
driver's license is not a "penalty" (emphasis his) resulting from
interstate relocation because all long-time residents of the new state
suffer the same disability. In view of the usual meaning of the word
"penalty," such a distinction is nonsense. In fact, the hypothetical
youth lost the right to drive precisely because he moved interstate.
The resulting loss of the driver's license will be the same disadvantage, disincentive, cost, net loss of benefits, or "penalty" to the
hypothetical youth whether or not all others in his new state suffer
the same disability.
The policy concern thrown into clear relief by Marshall's footnote is not a concern with the penalty or cost or disadvantage incurred as a result of interstate travel, but with the fact of
discrimination against newcomers in favor of long-time residents.
For Marshall (and, I submit, for all others in the majority in Shapiro
and Dunn), it is the discrimination between these two classes of
86.

Id. at 342 n.12.
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residents that calls for the application of the strict equal protection
standard.87 It is the thesis of this article that the Court by requiring
a showing of compelling state interest to justify the discrimination
in Shapiro and Dunn was intuitively establishing "newcomers" as
a suspect class entitled to the protection of the first branch of the
strict equal protection doctrine. Any doubt that the Court in
Shapiro and Dunn was really concerned with the nature of the disadvantaged class rather than with any effect on the right to travel
is eliminated by a reading of the Court's application of the ShapiroDunn rationale in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.8
IV.

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County

The state action alleged to violate the requirements of equal
protection in Maricopa was an Arizona statute requiring that an
indigent reside in a county for at least one year in order to be eligible
for nonemergency medical care at the county's expense." The case
arose out of Maricopa County's refusal to supply nonemergency
medical care to an indigent patient who had moved to the county
from the State of New Mexico approximately one month prior to his
request for care. Purporting to apply the Shapiro-Dunnrationale,
the Court held that Arizona's discrimination in the distribution of
free medical care between new and old residents of a county was
unequal treatment that penalized "indigents for exercising their
right to migrate to and settle in that State."" ° Since the county was
unable to convince the Court that the state interests served by the
residence requirement were compelling, the residence requirement
was held to violate the standards of the second or "fundamental
rights" branch of the strict equal protection doctrine.
As in Shapiro, the Court made no attempt to determine
whether or not the recently arrived indigent had given up similar
87. This focus on the class subjected to discrimination rather than on the effect on the
right to travel is strongly suggested at several critical points in the Shapiro and Dunn opinions. For example, in Shapiro the Court said:
There is no dispute that the effect of the waiting period requirement in each case is
to create two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except
that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of
residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction.
394 U.S. at 627. Similarly, in Dunn, the Court stated:
[Durational residence] laws divide residents into two classes, old residents and new
residents, and discriminate against the latter to the extent of totally denying the opportunity to vote.
405 U.S. at 334-35.
88. 415 U.S. 250, 254-62 (1974).
89. The statute made emergency medical care available to indigents without the restriction of a durational residence requirement.
90. 415 U.S. at 261-62.
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free medical care in New Mexico by moving to Maricopa County,
Arizona. While one might argue that it is reasonable to presume
that the plaintiffs in Shapiro gave up established rights to welfare
in their old states in order to move to the defendant states, it seems
considerably less likely that any indigents by moving to Maricopa
County, Arizona, from the other forty-nine states would be giving
up a right to medical care in their old states comparable to that
provided by Maricopa County." Thus any particular indigent moving to Maricopa County from outside the State of Arizona would
probably experience a net gain rather than a net loss in the availability of free medical care as a result of his interstate move. After
his move to Maricopa County he would at least be entitled to free
emergency medical care immediately and could expect free nonemergency medical care after one year's residence in the county. To
characterize broadly the possibility of such a net gain by the interstate move as a "penalty" on the indigent's interstate relocation in
Maricopa County defies common sense, yet that is the effect of the
Court's holding since it contains no indication that the particular
indigent suffered a net loss of medical benefits by his interstate
move to Maricopa County.
Even if we accept the Court's apparent view that the ShapiroDunn "penalty" rationale does not require that the traveller suffer
any net loss or disadvantage and applies even when the traveller has
experienced an improvement in his situation by virtue of the interstate move, the Shapiro-Dunnrationale simply cannot be made to
fit the facts of the Maricopacase. In order to determine whether the
second or "fundamental rights" branch of the strict equal protection doctrine applied to the classifications created by the Arizona
residence requirement in Maricopa, the Court quoted the passage
from the Shapiro opinion that has come to be viewed as the key to
that decision:
The Court observed that those requirements created two classes of needy residents "indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have
resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference
the first class [was] granted and the second class [was] denied welfare aid
"'92

Since the thrust of the Shapiro rationale is that such a distinction
must be justified by a compelling interest because it discriminates
against certain persons solely on the ground that they have recently
91.

See generally DEP'T OF

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT ON MEDICAL RE-

soURCEs AVAILABLE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS

92.

415 U.S. at 254 (quoting 394 U.S. at 627).

(Comm. Print 1961).
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exercised the fundamental right of interstatetravel, the word "jurisdiction" in the Court's quote from Shapiro must be read to mean
"state." Indeed, later in the Shapiro opinion a nearly identical
statement that the residence requirements denied "welfare benefits
to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they have recently
moved into the jurisdiction" was followed immediately by the statement, "but in moving from State to State. . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."9
The Court acknowledges this as its reading of the Shapiro rationale
by summarizing its holding in Maricopa with the statement that
"the right of interstatetravel must be seen as insuring new residents
the same right to vital government benefits and privileges in the
States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents."94
The Arizona county-residence requirement, however, did not grant
free medical care to one class of residents and deny it to a second
class solely on the ground that the second group recently had exercised its fundamental right to travel interstate. All indigent residents of Arizona, whether recent arrivals from out-of-state or lifelong residents of the state, were subject to the requirement that they
reside in the county for at least one year before receiving medical
care at the expense of that county. The class discriminated against
by the residence requirement was not determined by interstate
movement but rather included all state residents, new or old, who
had recently located in any county. In fact, the Arizona statute
under attack placed residents recently arrived from out of state into
the general pool of state residents and subjected them to the same
disability as older residents on precisely the same basis." Under the
standards laid down in Marshall's definitive footnote in Dunn, this
would seem to put the Arizona statute squarely within the category
of cases that do not present a penalty on the right to interstate
travel."8 Paraphrasing the Marshall footnote: In such a case the new
state's county-residence requirement is not a penalty imposed
93. 394 U.S. at 634; accord, id. at 638, 638 n.21, 644 (Stewart, J., concurring), 659
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. 415 U.S. at 261 (emphasis added).
95. According to the Arizona Supreme Court opinion in the case:
The requirement applies to all citizens within the state including long term residents of
one county who move to another county. Thus, the classification does not single out nonresidents nor attempt to penalize interstate travel. The requirement is uniformly applied.
Maricopa County v. Superior Court, 108 Ariz. 373, 375, 498 P.2d 461, 463 (1972); accord,
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 270 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. 405 U.S. at 342 n.12 (quoted in text accompanying note 86 supra).
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solely because the newcomer is a new resident of the state; indeed,
all residents of the state, old and new, must live in the county for
at least one year in order to receive free medical care from that
county. Just as no resident of the state in the Marshall footnote,
whether old or new, could obtain a driver's license until he reached
the age of eligibility, so no resident of Arizona, old or new, could
obtain medical care from the county until he had resided in that
county for one year. Thus, one would conclude that Shapiro and
Dunn do not require that Arizona show a compelling interest but
only the usual rational basis for the discrimination in the residence
requirement.
In spite of the inadequacy of the Shapiro-Dunn "penalty" rationale to support the Court's holding in Maricopa,the Court summarily dismissed this objection to its application of the rationale by
the bold assertion that the indigent in Maricopa was "effectively
penalized for his interstate migration, although this was accomplished under the guise of a county residence requirement."9' The
best explanation for the Court's insistence that the Shapiro-Dunn
rationale requires a compelling interest to justify the residence requirement in Maricopa is that the underlying policy concern which
caused the Court to impose the compelling interest test on the classifications in Shapiro and Dunn is present in Maricopa,even though
the articulated rationale of Shapiro and Dunn does not apply to
Maricopa.As suggested in the discussion of Dunn, the Court's intuitive concern is not with the penalty or cost or disadvantage incurred
as a result of interstate travel, but with the fact of discrimination
by a governmental unit against newcomers to that unit. It would be
difficult to find a clearer indication of this underlying concern in
Maricopa than the Court's quotation of the following admonition
from the Bible: "'Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the
stranger, as for one of your own country,' Leviticus 24:22."11 Since
in Maricopathe Court insisted on applying the compelling interest
test to discrimination against newcomers, even though unlike
Shapiro and Dunn the newcomers discriminated against as a class
could not be equated with the class of recent exercisers of the right
to travel interstate, the inescapable conclusion is that the Court has
intuitively established newcomers to a governmental unit as a "suspect class" entitled to strict equal protection under the laws of that
unit. Only that conclusion explains adequately the apparent inconsistencies and logical gaps in the Court's position that Shapiro,
Dunn, and Maricopa are analogous cases in which the equal protec97.
98.

415 U.S. at 256.
Id. at 261.
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tion clause requires a compelling state interest to justify the discrimination.
Possibly the best evidence that the articulated rationale of
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa does not accurately describe the actual concerns of the Court in those cases is the Court's refusal to find
that the Shapiro-Dunn rationale requires the application of the
compelling interest test in equal protection cases in which the basis
of the disadvantaged classification is the exercise of a fundamental
right other than travel. One week after release of the opinion in
which the Court strained unconvincingly to apply the ShapiroDunn rationale in Maricopa, the Court in Johnson v. Robison" refused to apply the rationale to a set of facts indistinguishable from
Shapiro and Dunn in terms of the "penalty" imposed by the classification on the exercise of a fundamental right. '
In Johnson, the Court faced a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966,11 which provided educational benefits to selective service registrants who were
required to serve on active duty with the armed forces but denied
such benefits to selective service registrants who were required to
perform alternative service because of "conscientious-objector" status. Conscientious-objector status was conferred by statute only on
individuals "who, by reason of religious training and belief" were
opposed to participation in "war in any form.""1 2 Thus, under the
Shapiro-Dunnreasoning, it would seem clear that denial of benefits
to the class who performed alternative service as conscientious
objectors constituted unequal treatment on the basis of a classification that penalized the fundamental right to free exercise of religion.
As a result, one would have expected the Court to subject the discrimination to the compelling interest test under the fifth amendment parallel to the equal protection requirements imposed in
Shapiro and Dunn. In fact, however, the Court explicitly measured
the discrimination only against the requirement that the classification "'be reasonable, not arbitrary.' """ Since the Court found "a
rational basis for Congress' classification," ' 4 the unequal treatment
was found not to violate equal protection.0 '
99. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
100. See United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367, 375 (7th Cir. 1974).
101. Act of Mar. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-358, 80 Stat. 12 (codified in scattered sections

of 38 U.S.C.).
102. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970).
103. 415 U.S. at 374 (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) &
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
104. Id. at 381-82.
105. The theoretical inconsistency between Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopaand Johnson can
hardly be explained by a simple shift in the political alignments among the Justices. Justice
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The plaintiff's argument that a Shapiro-style analysis required
the application of the compelling interest test was dispensed with
in a footnote to Justice Brennan's majority opinion. According to
the footnote, the discrimination was not subjected to the compelling
interest test because the Court concluded that the denial of benefits
did not violate the plaintiffs substantive first amendment right to
free exercise of religion." 6 This reasoning is inconsistent with
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa because nowhere in these cases is
there the slightest hint that the Shapiro strict equal protection rationale applies only when the discrimination is first found to violate
the fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to travel.'07
As suggested earlier in the discussion of Shapiro,'°8 the Court would
probably find completely unacceptable any inference from the
Shapiro "penalty" rationale that the statutes in Shapiro, Dunn, and
Maricopainfringed the right to travel in violation of substantive due
process. Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa must be read to hold that
equal protection requires the application of the compelling interest
test to a classification that in some sense penalizes a fundamental
right, even though the statute is not found to violate directly a
substantive fundamental right. In other words, far from providing
a basis for distinguishing Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa from
Johnson, the Brennan footnote would be equally applicable to
Shapiro,Dunn, and Maricopaand would require the opposite result
in those cases.
No element of the Shapiro "penalty-on-a-fundamental-right"
rationale suggests that its applicability should be confined to the
fundamental right to travel and not extended to other fundamental
rights. The right to free exercise of religion, the exercise of which
formed the basis of the disadvantaged classification in Johnson, was
certainly as fundamental as the right to travel, the exercise of which
was the basis of the classifications in Shapiro and Dunn.'°' And the
Marshall, who wrote the opinions for the Court in Dunn and Maricopa, concurred by silence
in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Johnson. Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
had written for the Court in Shapiro and concurred by silence in Marshall's opinion for the
Court in Dunn and Maricopa.

106. 415 U.S. at 375 n.14.
107. Justice Harlan demonstrated in his dissent in Shapiro that if the applicability of
the Shapiro equal protection rationale in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopahad depended upon
a prior finding that the classification "penalized" the right to travel in violation of substantive due process, there would have been no need to reach the equal protection question at
all. 394 U.S. at 659; see note 46 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 44-74 supra.
109. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), on which the Shapiro Court relied for
the penalty rationale, a state interference with the right to free exercise of religion was
invalidated on substantive due process grounds for failure to meet the compelling interest test
applied by the Court.
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loss of economic benefits in Johnson was precisely the same sort of
penalty on the exercise of the fundamental right as the loss of economic benefits in Shapiro and Maricopa."° In terms of the articulated rationale of Shapiro, there simply is no distinction between
Shapiro and Johnson. The opposite results in the two cases are best
explained in terms of the thesis that the concern of the Court in
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa is with the suspect nature of the
category "newcomers" rather than with any effect on the exercise
of a fundamental right. While the right to travel and the right of free
exercise of religion may be equally fundamental and may have been
equally "penalized" in the Shapiro sense, only the exercise of the
right to travel creates the class of "newcomers."
In Johnson, the articulated rationale of Shapiro and Dunn fits
perfectly because the basis of the disadvantaged classification was
the exercise of a fundamental right. Yet the Court refused to apply
the rationale because the underlying concern of the Court in Shapiro
and Dunn was not present in Johnson. The exercise of the fundamental right in Johnson had not created the suspect class of newcomers to a governmental unit. In Maricopa, on the other hand, the
articulated rationale of Shapiro and Dunn simply did not fit the
facts because the disadvantaged class was not confined to recent
exercisers of the fundamental right to travel interstate-all residents of the state were equally subjected to the same requirement
of one year's residence in the county. Yet the Court insisted on
applying the Shapiro-Dunnrationale in Maricopa because the underlying concern of the Court in Shapiro and Dunn also was present
in Maricopa. The result of the statute in Maricopawas discrimination by the county governmental unit against the suspect class of
newcomers to that unit. The existence of that suspect class triggered
strict equal protection review in Shapiro,Dunn, and Maricopa, and
the absence of that class in Johnson resulted in the application of
the more tolerant standard of equal protection review.
Since its decision in Maricopa, the Court has had one further
encounter with the question of the constitutional validity of a state
durational residence requirement. Unfortunately, the Court's resolution of that issue in the case of Sosna v. Iowa' contributes little,
if anything, to an understanding of the conceptual dynamics of the
Shapiro-Dunn-Maricoparationale.
110. But see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,452-53, 452 n.9 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). See also Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259-60, 260 n.15 (1974); text accompanying notes
58-72 supra.
111. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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Sosna v. Iowa

In Sosna, a federal district court had upheld the constitutional
validity of an Iowa statutory requirement that a petitioner in a
divorce action be a resident of the state for one year preceding the
filing of the petition. According to the appellant, the Shapiro-DunnMaricopa line of authority required a finding that the requirement
of one year's residence as a condition for eligibility for divorce created a classification that penalized the right to travel and therefore
violated the equal protection clause unless supported by a compelling state interest. This contention that the "fundamental rights"
branch of the strict equal protection doctrine required a showing of
a compelling state interest to justify the discrimination against new
residents was of course the core of the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopa
holdings. It is precisely this contention, however, that the Court's
opinion in Sosna conspicuously failed to discuss in the process of
affirming the district court's holding that the residence requirement
did not violate equal protection. Instead, the Court simply distinguished Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa from Sosna on the ground
that, while the "budgetary or record keeping considerations" offered
as justifications for the residence requirements in Shapiro, Dunn,
and Maricopa were "insufficient to outweigh the constitutional
claims of the individuals, 11 2 the state interest offered in support
of the residence requirement in Sosna required "a different resolution of the constitutional issue presented. 113 The state interests
held to be sufficient to justify the discrimination in Sosna were the
"state interest in requiring that those who seek a divorce from its
courts be genuinely attached to the State" and "a desire to insulate
divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack" in other
states that retained an interest in the status of the marriage.' 4 The
problem presented by the Court's approach in Sosna is that it never
directly stated the standard, rational basis or compelling interest or
something in between, against which it was measuring the sufficiency of the state interest. Thus, it is not clear from the opinion
whether the Court has found the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricoparequirement of a compelling interest satisfied in this case or whether it has
retreated from the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopacompelling interest requirement and returned to some standard closer to the usual rational basis requirement.
Since the members of the majority in Sosna had split on the
question of the appropriate standard in Maricopa and Dunn, the
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 409.
Id.
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failure of the majority opinion to state explicitly its standard is
probably more than accidental. Justice Rehnquist, who authored
the majority opinion in Sosna, had dissented strongly in Maricopa,
specifically on the issue of the standard that should be used to
measure the sufficiency of the state interest."' Since Justice
Rehnquist found the "penalty-on-the-right-to-travel" rationale logically defective for many of the reasons discussed earlier, it was his
opinion that the usual rational basis test should have been applied
in Maricopa.Thus it is reasonable to conclude that the standard he
found satisfied by the state's interest in Sosna was the rational basis
standard. Justices Burger and Blackmun, who had earlier indicated
dissatisfaction with the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricoparationale,"' joined
with Justice Rehnquist in his majority opinion and can be assumed
to share his views about the standard that should be applied. On
the other hand, Justice Rehnquist was joined also in his majority
opinion by Justices Stewart and Powell, who apparently concurred
in the Court's opinion in Maricopa, and by Justice Douglas, who,
while expressing doubts about the "penalty-on-the-right-to-travel"
rationale in his separate opinion in Maricopa,17 concurred in the
result in that case and apparently concurred in the Court's opinion
in Dunn. These three Justices, then, either retreated from the
Shapiro-Dunn-Maricoparequirement of a compelling state interest
or found that requirement satisfied in this case. If these three Justices agreed with Justice Rehnquist that the standard should now
be rational basis, he presumably would have stated that standard
in his opinion and overruled Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that at least two of these three Justices
applied the compelling interest test required by Shapiro,Dunn, and
Maricopa and found it satisfied in Sosna.
In fact, the concurrence of these three Justices in Justice
Rehnquist's unspecific opinion is probably nothing more than a
further demonstration of the validity of Justice Marshall's "sliding
scale" analysis of the standard of justification required of the state
in cases of unequal treatment of individuals.' Certainly Iowa's interest in avoiding the destruction or dislocation of marital relationships and child custody arrangements in which other states retained
a continuing interest is a greater justification for discrimination
against newcomers than the purely internal bureaucratic and budg115. 415 U.S. at 277-88.
116. See id. at 270 (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., concurring in the result); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
117. 415 U.S. at 270 (Douglas, J., concurring).
118. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
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etary state interests advanced as justifications in Shapiro, Dunn,
and Maricopa. But the interests advanced by Iowa hardly seem to
be as "compelling" as those customarily required by the Court as
justification when the inequality involves access to the ballot or is
On the other hand, the evil rebased upon racial classification.'
sulting from the discrimination in Sosna does not seem as serious
to the majority as the evil of discrimination based on race or discrimination in the regulation of access to the ballot. The majority,
applying the Marshall sliding scale of strictness without any explicit
statement of the standard of strictness being applied, found the
justification for the discrimination to be adequate.
Unfortunately, the majority failed to state which of Marshall's
sliding scales they were applying-the sliding scale of importance
of the individual interest unequally regulated or the sliding scale of
the invidiousness of the classification chosen by the state. Because
of this inconsiderate theoretical oversight, the Sosna decision contributes very little toward validating or discrediting the thesis that
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa establish "newcomers" as a suspect
category-that is, that the underlying concern of the Court in each
of those cases was with a defect in the classification rather than with
any effect on the fundamental right to travel. Translated into the
terms of the Marshall sliding-scale analysis, the thesis would be
that Shapiro, Dunn, Maricopa, and Sosna actually reflect the
Court's intuitive application of the sliding scale of invidiousness of
the classification to the class "newcomers" rather than the sliding
scale of importance of the individual interest to the interest in freedom to travel. If in fact Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa establish
"newcomers" as a suspect class, Sosna does indicate that a majority
of the current Court will be satisfied with somewhat less "compelling" reasons for discrimination against newcomers than they would
have required for discrimination against a racial minority. Thus,
after Sosna one might conclude that the line of cases from Shapiro
through Sosna establishes newcomers as a class that will be viewed
by the Court with about the same level of suspicion as that accorded
classification on the basis of sex.
VI.

NEwcoMERS

AS A SUSPECT CLASS

None of the reasoning in the classic cases applying strict equal
protection to unequal regulation of fundamental rights provides a
119. As the Court noted, at least two states seem to be able to do without such a
residence requirement. 419 U.S. at 404-05 n.15. Also, the Supreme Court of Alaska refused
to regard interests similar to those offered by Iowa as compelling and held the state's residency requirement for div(irce unconstitutional on the basis of the Shapiro rationale. State
v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974).
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firm theoretical basis for the Shapiro-Dunnrationale, and the extension of the classic reasoning to accommodate the Shapiro and
Dunn holdings gives rise to unacceptable analytic consequences in
other cases. On the other hand, reading Shapiro, Dunn, and
Maricopa to establish "newcomers" as a suspect class is perfectly
consistent with the reasoning of the Court in the classic cases creating the suspect class rationale for strict equal protection. In fact,
"newcomers" would be an entirely appropriate addition to the limited list of suspect classes aside from any implication to that effect
in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa.
It is generally assumed that the purpose of those who authored
and adopted the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause was
the protection of black citizens from disadvantageous treatment by
state governments under the control of whites."' Although the general language of the clause has traditionally been held to invalidate
all irrational unequal treatment by a state, this legislative purpose
or history could have been used as a basis for confining strict equal
protection to cases of discrimination against blacks. Instead, the
Court has adopted a broader perspective and has applied strict
equal protection whenever the disadvantaged group occupies the
same position with respect to state government as that occupied by
blacks. Thus, disadvantageous state treatment of a class composed
of citizens of oriental descent1 21 or a class composed of alien residents 22 will be subjected to strict scrutiny.
The Court has indicated several significant factors in the composition of a group that in some combination will trigger strict review of disadvantageous state treatment of the group. First, the
disadvantaged group must be a political "minority"; that is, the
group must be incapable of protecting its interests through the usual
political processes. 2 The fourteenth amendment and all other individual rights in the Constitution are a last resort to protect the
rights of minorities and individuals after the majoritarian legislative
120. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873); Bickel, The OriginalUnderstandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 60 (1955); Black, supra note 5, at 423. For a discussion of
the legislative history of the equal protection clause see Frank & Munro, The OriginalUnderstanding of "Equal Protectionof the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950).
121. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644 (1948).
122. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); accord, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
123. According to the Court in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, the
"traditional indicia of suspectness" are that the class be "saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); accord, Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14
(1974).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

process has failed to accommodate those interests.'24 Certainly
"newcomers" as a class are almost always a minority in the governmental unit, unable to protect their interests through the political
process. The fact that one remains a member of the class only for a
certain period of time, gradually acquiring the perspective and
vested interests of the "old-timers," assures the continuance of both
the minority status and the political impotence of the "newcomer"
class.
On the other hand, not every class that constitutes a political
minority is considered a suspect class entitled to strict equal protection. Indeed, any group that suffers a relative disadvantage as a
result of the passage of any legislative measure probably will be a
minority in terms of the effect of that legislation. Since the controlling majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself very often, the majoritarian legislative process will almost always assure that any relative
disadvantage will be borne by a group that is a political minority
on that issue. Thus, the second requirement for a suspect class
seems to be that the minority be an usually likely candidate for
124. In Johnson v. Robison, the Court quoted the district court's statement of the
rationale behind the suspect classification doctrine: "[W]here legislation affects discrete and
insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political
processes may have broken down." 415 U.S. at 375 n.14. Thus, it would hardly seem necessary
as a matter of constitutional or political theory to provide strict protection of the political
majority against a majoritarian legislative decision to disadvantage the political majority in
favor of some politically powerless minority.
This view of the rationale for strict judicial scrutiny of suspect classifications would
explain the apparent inconsistency between the application of a strict standard of review to
the sex discrimination in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and a tolerant rational
basis test to the sex discrimination in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The history of
disadvantageous treatment of women by the male-dominated legislative process makes the
disadvantageous treatment of women in Frontieroimmediately "suspect." 411 U.S. at 686
n.17. On the other hand, males would not seem to need "extraordinary protection" from the
decision of the male-dominated legislature in Kahn to favor females at the expense of males.
Since one confidently can assume that the interests of the politically powerful male class will
be adequately protected by the male-dominated legislature, the presumption of constitutionality inherent in the tolerant rational basis test would seem to be appropriate.
A similar explanation could be offered for the Court's otherwise inexplicable holding in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), that the equal protection issue was moot. Since
by all recent standards of mootness the issue was still ripe for decision, e.g., Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Court's
holding can be viewed as an unprincipled attempt to avoid the application of strict scrutiny
or the compelling interest test to compensatory discrimination by a state law school in favor
of black applicants at the expense of whites. Consistency and candor would have been far
better served by a direct application of the tolerant rational basis standard to that racial
discrimination on the simple ground that there was no reason to be unusually suspicious of a
decision of the white political majority to favor blacks at the expense of whites.
In view of the underlying rationale for the suspect classification doctrine and the Court's
actions in Kahn and DeFunis, it seems quite likely that it is not the basis of the classification
(sex or race), but rather the disadvantaged class (women or blacks) that is constitutionally
suspect.
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pervasive discriminatory treatment on a wide range of issues. 1 5 To
be such a likely candidate, a minority should have an easily identifiable membership at any given time, and the criteria for membership
must be such that no significant number of the political majority
run the risk of falling into the class in the future as a result of
changing circumstances. In the oft-quoted words of Mr. Justice
Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Caroline Products
Co. ,12 the minority must be "discrete and insular."' 27 Since even in
our mobile society the vast bulk of the political majority does not
expect to suffer membership in the class "newcomers" any more
than it expects to suffer membership in the class of blacks or aliens,
relatively little political inclination is present to protect the interests of the class. In fact, the majority's inclination is almost automatically the opposite. As with blacks and aliens, the members of
the class of "newcomers" are viewed as sufficiently different by
oldtimers in the political majority of any governmental unit that the
class is easily stereotyped as ignorant, unreliable, or in some other
way inadequate and unworthy of full participation in the society.
Such stereotypical reasoning was specifically offered in justification
for the residence requirements in Shapiro,121 Dunn, 21 and
s°
Maricopa.1
Common experience indicates that something in the basic nature of man, some chauvinistic instinct, causes him to band together
into groups of "insiders," which then cultivate a sense of security
by fervently and irrationally discriminating against "outsiders."
Newcomers are certainly among the most common victims of this
discriminatory instinct. From the earliest loose associations of child
playmates, through the social cliques of high school and the fraternities and sororities of college, to the political organizations on the
local, state, and national level, newcomers have traditionally suffered discrimination simply because they are newcomers. As with
125. One commentator has pointed out the similarities between sex and race discrimination in that both classifications create "large, natural classes" and are "highly visible
characteristics on which legislators have found it easy to draw gross, stereotypical distinctions." Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection:Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination].

The plurality in Frontieroadopted this line of reasoning, noting also that both characteristics
"frequently [bear] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." 411 U.S. at
686. See also Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 732-33, 242 P.2d 617, 627 (1952) (alienage does

not establish a person as disloyal and uninterested in the welfare of the community);
Developments, supra note 28, at 1127.
126. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
127. Id. at 153 n.4.
128. 394 U.S. at 631-32.
129. 405 U.S. at 354-56.
130. 415 U.S. at 266.
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other psychological phenomena, varied and complex explanations
are possible, but the tendency to discriminate against newcomers is
verified by experiences in everyone's life. Such a minority would
seem to be a particularly appropriate subject for the special protection afforded suspect classes like blacks and aliens. 31'
Finally, a presumption against the constitutionality of discriminatory treatment of certain minorities arises from a long history of
irrational or unnecessary legal discrimination against the minority.132 As is the case with blacks and aliens, the social tendency to
exclude newcomers has regularly been embodied in state law. Exercise of the franchise,'3 3 eligibility for state office,' access to state
courts in divorce cases,'35 availability of welfare payments, 3 6 and
availability of in-state college tuition benefits'37 all traditionally
have been conditioned upon durational residence requirements in
addition to simple state citizenship.
Although it seems clearly reasonable to distinguish transients
from bona fide residents,'3 8 it is difficult to justify differences in
131. See generally Sex Discrimination,supra note 125, at 1507-08.
132. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.
2d 718, 738-52, 242 P.2d 617, 630-39 (1952) (Carter, J., concurring); Black, supra note 5, at
424-25; Developments, supra note 28, at 1127; Sex Discrimination,supra note 125, at 150708.
133. See Cocanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 ARIZ. L. REv. 477,
484-85 (1970); Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in PresidentialElections, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 359 (1970); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
134. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. V, § 2 (residence requirement of 5 years for governor); GA.
CONST. art. V, § 2-3006 (governor must have been a United States citizen for 15 years and
state resident for 6 years); N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (requirement of 5 years durational
residence for governor); see Comment, DurationalResidence Requirements for Candidates,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (1973).
135. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4530 (West 1970) (6 months in state, 3 months in county);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.6 (Supp. 1975-76) (one year in state); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 16 (Supp.
1974) (6 months in state). For a collection of the various state requirements see NATIONAL
LEGAL AID & DEFENDERS ASS'N, DIVORCE, ANNULMENT AND SEPARATION IN THE UNITED STATES

(1973). See also Comment, The Demise of the DurationalResident Requirement, 26 Sw. L.J.
538 (1972).
136. See Harvith, The Constitutionalityof Residence Tests for General and Categorical
Assistance Programs, 54 CAL. L. REV. 567 (1966); Note, Residence Requirements in State
Public Welfare Statutes-I, 51 IOWA L. REV. 1080 (1966); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
137. Bornstein, Residency Laws and the College Student, 1 J. LAW & EDUC. 349 (1972);
Spencer, The Legal Aspects of the Nonresident Tuition Fee, 6 ORE. L. REV. 332 (1927); see
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stains v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970),
aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). The holding in Starns and the suggestion in Vlandis (412
U.S. at 452 n.9) that durational residence requirements for in-state tuition do not violate
equal protection already seem inconsistent with Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa. 412 U.S. at
455 (Marshall, J., concurring). A direct recognition that newcomers are a suspect class would
seem to dictate a finding that such residence requirements violate the equal protection clause
unless justified by some compelling state interest.
138. The Court has recognized this distinction in upholding reasonable disadvantages
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treatment between new and old bona fide residents of the state in
the distribution of the benefits and responsibilities of state citizenship. As the Supreme Court commented in the course of the Shapiro
opinion, admitting the validity of such a distinction "would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and
' One is left,
libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection."139
as is the Court, with the presumption that most instances of such
discriminatory treatment are explained by the social tendency to
discriminate against newcomers as newcomers, rather than by any
reasonable state objective that necessitates the unequal treatment. That presumption of irrationality is tantamount to the establishment of "newcomers" as a suspect class.14°
Of course, it is not coincidence that the factors that traditionally have established a class as suspect apply with considerable
force to the class of "newcomers" entitled to strict equal protection
under Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa. It was precisely this set of
intuitive concerns that brought the Court to the results in Shapiro,
Dunn, Maricopa, and Johnson, although the articulated rationale
was logically inadequate to accommodate the results in each of
those cases.
In an effort to place the Shapiro holding on a sounder theoretical footing, the plaintiff in Dunn suggested on appeal to the Supreme Court that Shapiro should be read as holding that a "classification on the sole basis of exercising a constitutionally protected
right" is a suspect class for purposes of strict equal protection."' The
Marshall opinion for the Court in Dunn, however, made no mention
of that suggested reading of Shapiro. Such a reading would be a step
closer to the intuitive concerns of the Court in Shapiro, in that it
focuses on a defect in the classification rather than on any effect on
a fundamental right. But that suspect class rationale is constructed
solely out of the vague implications of Shapiro and is not independently defensible on the basis of the reasoning of the classic suspect
category cases. The class of "recent exercisers of a fundamental
right" is really many classes of widely varying content that have
rarely if ever been identified as discrete classes or subjected to any
placed upon transient nonresidents. Stains v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Minn.
1970), afl'd. mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). See generally Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53
(1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972).
139. 394 U.S. at 632.
140. As Justice Traynor said: "Any state legislation discriminating against persons on
the basis of [a suspect classification] has to overcome the strong presumption inherent in
this constitutional policy." Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 719, 198 P.2d 17, 21 (sub nom.
Perez v. Lippold) (1948). See also Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952);
Developments, supra note 28, at 1101.
141. Brief for Appellee at 48, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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unequal treatment by the state. No traditional pattern of irrational
discrimination against the many diverse groups defined by recent
exercise of one of the several fundamental rights is apparent, nor
does the class of recent exercisers of any given fundamental right at
any given time necessarily represent a minority, much less a minority that is customarily insular and politically impotent. In short,
the philosophical underpinnings for the suspect category rationale
simply do not apply with any persuasive force to the amorphous
class of "recent exercisers of a fundamental right." Furthermore,
such a suspect class would be subject to Justice Harlan's objection
to the articulated rationale of Shapiro-thatis, that it is a completely unnecessary addition to established substantive due process
doctrine. Justice Harlan would argue, as he did in Shapiro, that
cases of disadvantageous treatment of such a class should be dealt
with as potential violations of the substantive right the exercise of
which defines the class.' 42
Because the suggestion that "recent exercisers of a fundamental right" are a suspect class does not accurately reflect the underlying policy concerns of the Court in Shapiro and Dunn, it has proved
no more adequate than the articulated rationale of Shapiro and
Dunn in accommodating the apparently inconsistent applications
since Dunn of the Shapirorationale. The Court in Maricopainsisted
that Shapiro and Dunn required application of the compelling interest test to a class that in fact was not defined in terms of recent
exercise of the fundamental right to travel interstate or recent exercise of any other recognized fundamental right. The common characteristic of the disadvantaged class in Maricopa was merely recent
arrival in the county, whether from out of state or from another
county within the state. Nor does adding "recent exercisers of a
fundamental right" to the list of suspect categories explain the holding in cases like Johnson. There the disadvantaged class was defined
specifically in terms of recent exercise of the fundamental right to
free exercise of religion, yet the Court refused to subject the classification to the compelling interest test. A finding that "recent exercisers of a fundamental right" constituted a suspect category would
have necessitated the application of the compelling interest test,
which would probably have required a finding that the discrimination violated equal protection.
The apparent inconsistencies in the application of the ShapiroDunn rationale in Maricopa and Johnson are explained only by the
recognition that Shapiro and Dunn establish "newcomers" as a sus142. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoted at
note 46 supra).
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pect category entitled to strict equal protection. A forthright recognition by the Court of this analytical consequence of its holdings in
Shapiro, Dunn, Maricopa, and cases like Johnson would bring the
Court back to a workable articulation of its original instinct in
Shapiro-that is, that the problem involved something inherently
defective about the class chosen rather than some interference with
a fundamental right. The conceptual confusion created by the rationale in Shapiro has grown to the point that Justice Marshall was
moved to assert in his opinion for the Court in Maricopa the novel
notion that the fundamental right to travel provides equal protection. According to Justice Marshall:
[The right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the
same right to vital government benefits and privileges in the States to which
they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents.'

Until the Court's analytical misstep in Shapiro, one confidently
would have assumed that it was the equal protection clause that
guaranteed equal protection for all state residents, new or old. It
hardly seems wise to burden an already overworked fundamental
right to travel with the job of providing precisely the kind of protection against unequal distribution of government benefits that the
equal protection clause traditionally has been held to provide.
143.

415 U.S. at 261.

